

Introduction

Economic sanctions' long history is studied by individual scholars and small teams working within different fields and time periods. The contemporary "sanctions debate" is a vigorous multidisciplinary endeavor but has not yet achieved the status of interdisciplinary conversation between, among others, political scientists, economists, humanitarians, and historians. Moreover, social scientists and medievalists alike may want to account for the fact that modern economic sanctions originated in Christian disciplinary practices, on the one hand, and the laws of the Roman Empire, on the other hand, and that sanctions have been in constant use in Europe since the later Middle Ages. *Economic Warfare and the Crusades* sheds light on one side of the multifaceted history of sanctions while inviting cross-disciplinary conversation. This introduction begins with an overview of the sanctions debate within the social sciences, proceeds by briefly tracing the origins of economic sanctions, and concludes by highlighting the contributions of this international collaboration in relation to both medieval history and the contemporary sanctions debate.

The Sanctions Debate and Economic Warfare

Within the "sanctions debate", economic sanctions is understood "to mean the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations"¹. Notably, the concept of economic sanctions denotes the restriction of one or more types of economic activity between two or more political entities in the pursuit of a broadly political, rather than narrowly economic goal². For example, economic restrictions aimed at improving the terms of trade, such as a Venetian withdrawal from Constantinople to force the Byzantine emperor to drop a newly imposed tax or disagreements between the German Hansa and the English crown are considered "trade wars" and thus a separate research subject. Within the sanctions debate, the term "embargo" is normally used to denote a prohibition on export trade while "boycott" signifies import restrictions. Financial sanctions are commonly the major complement to trade bans. Sanctions, furthermore, can be total or targeted in terms of people (from the entire population to select individuals) or in terms of trade items (from

1. Hufbauer *et al.*, 2007, p. 3.

2. On terminology and typology, Baldwin, 1985, p. 29-50.

total trade bans to narrowly defined goods) and by extension to types of financial activity³.

A fundamental analytical bifurcation underpins the study of sanctions. There are long-term, “strategic” sanctions aimed at tilting the balance of power in favor of a polity or an alliance relative to their competitors. The most notable historical example of such sanctions is the papal embargo against all papal enemies. Western sanctions against the eastern bloc during the Cold War were its best-known modern counterpart. Accordingly, the pioneering treatises on the subject were not written by modern political scientists, but by a host of medieval authors from different backgrounds. The most notable among them is the in-depth analysis of political economy offered by the Venetian Marin Sanudo the Elder (d. 1343) in the early fourteenth century (see Chapter 1 below)⁴. The effects of strategic embargoes are by definition subtle and understood—in the fourteenth century as much as in the twentieth—not as self-sufficient alternatives to military action but rather as the necessary precondition for securing success during an eventual war effort. The end of the Cold War, however, marked a shift in emphasis in the use and study of economic sanctions.

The prevalent form of contemporary sanctions are restrictions in economic relations presented by political leaders and analyzed by scholars as short-term tools that aim at coercing the target at enacting a specific policy change. Sometimes, this type of economic sanctions—“the actual or threatened withdrawal of economic resources to affect a policy change by the target”—is so dominant as to be the only one considered⁵. Although sanctions that aimed at coercing a change in behavior were constantly employed in the Middle Ages, the goals of the campaigns that came to be known as crusades were long-term and strategic in nature.

Strategic embargoes are sometimes called “economic warfare”. When used in this fashion, the latter concept explicitly excludes military action. However, economic warfare is often used to denote military action against economic targets⁶. This ambiguity in the usage of “economic warfare” has relegated the concept to backstage. A representative sample of 158 articles written over the last quarter century and drawn from a variety of journals and fields of study (the database considered for the purpose of this introduction), features 2122 mentions of “embargo”, 1983 of “economic sanctions”, and all of twenty mentions of “economic warfare”⁷.

3. A helpful typology of sanctions can be found in Forland, 1993, p. 151-162.

4. Sanudo Torsello/Prawer, 1972; English translation Sanudo Torsello/Lock, 2011.

5. Chan and Drury, 2000, p. 1-16, at 1-2.

6. Many exclude economic measures taken in the midst of military action from their analysis. Some use economic warfare to denote any economic actions as well as the destruction of economic targets during war. Others, however, use the term to denote long-term, strategic embargoes, see Baldwin, 1985, p. 36-38, Forland 1991, Lindsay, 1986, Pape, 1997.

7. Results provided by research software produced by a team led by Stefan Stantchev and comprised of Arizona State University’s Fulton School of Engineering students Zishen Wei, Caleb Pa-

Yet, when it comes to the history of crusading and economic sanctions in the later Middle Ages, there is little to be gained from drawing a sharp boundary between military action and (allegedly) non-violent tools of coercion. The first wide ranging attempt at economic sanctions in medieval Europe, the papal embargo against Muslims and specifically Egypt, emerged in the context of battlefield failures. The first attempt at a complete trade embargo, specifically, was a direct consequence of the disaster at Hattin in 1187 and Saladin's consequent capture of Jerusalem. Embargo thus became a policy tool because of a uniquely consequential battlefield defeat, not because of a desire to avoid military action. Embargoes against "heretics" originated in the face of a perceived onslaught against the Roman Church in Provence some two decades before the crusade became a tool used against heretics. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 1 below, when crusader theorists weaved together economic and military action at the turn of the fourteenth century, they conceived of the two as interlinked if successive steps in achieving crusading goals in the Holy Land. In short, the modern concept of "economic sanctions" draws a sharp boundary between "war" and "peace" in the context of a system of international law and order while the more ambiguous term "economic warfare" blurs the boundaries between economic and military action⁸. "Economic warfare" is thus better suited to describe the intersections between embargoes and crusading in the absence of a generally agreed upon system of "international" or "interfaith" relations in the later Middle Ages.

The two main areas of research within the contemporary sanctions debate have traditionally concerned the effectiveness and "side-effects" of economic sanctions. Each of these areas of inquiry bifurcates into independent sub-fields of study. The debate about sanctions effectiveness, originally focused exclusively on their stated goals of foreign policy, has come to allow for consideration of the "symbolic" relevance of sanctions, on the one hand, and of instrumental uses within the domestic sphere, on the other hand. Similarly, the question of the side-effects of sanctions, originally focused on their humanitarian consequences, has broadened to encompass the study of criminal networks, trade maps, and political alliances.

The focal question in the study of modern sanctions originally concerned their effectiveness because "...the crucial question 'does economic warfare work?' is really the futurologists' 'will it work?' disguised in the present tense"⁹. The first wave of studies into economic sanctions, which dates to the 1960s and 1970s, centered "on prominent cases that were 'prominent' precisely because they had gone on for a long time without success. This obvious selection bias led to the general conclusion that economic sanctions did not work"¹⁰. In the mid-1980s,

nikulam, Yogendra Awatramani, Franklin Paul, and Alex Yuwen.

8. On sanctions relative to concepts of international order see Stantchev 2021a.

9. Forland, 1993, p. 153.

10. Clifton Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014, p. 541-58, at 542.

however, David Baldwin and Gary Hufbauer sparked the actual sanctions debate by 1/ placing it on sound analytical foundations and 2/ by arguing that economic sanctions can, in fact, work¹¹. Baldwin studies the use of economic means for the attainment of foreign policy goals within a system of power relations, which he terms “economic statecraft”. Hufbauer’s *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, which saw subsequent revised editions co-authored with Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, marked a re-orientation from the study of long-lasting systems of export controls (strategic embargoes) to sanctions that aim at debilitating the economy of the target for the purpose of coercing a specific policy change. This re-orientation from strategic to “tactical” sanctions, however, reinforced the critics’ maximalism, whereby sanctions “work” only so long as the stated policy change is fully enacted. The deep rift in the assessment of sanctions effectiveness has largely remained in place. In the 1990s, Robert Pape fought back arguing that “the old conventional wisdom was right: there is little valid social science support for claims that economic sanctions can achieve major foreign policy goals¹²”. In turn, subsequent editions of *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* defend the work’s complex methodology designed to account for degrees of success, finding sanctions to have been “at least partially successful in 34 percent” of 174 cases¹³. The supposedly opposing views, moreover, are not necessarily as distant as rhetoric would make it appear. As Elliott points out, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* finds that sanctions are of “limited utility” and that their effectiveness has “declined sharply over time¹⁴”.

Subsequent work has sought to infuse further analytical distinctions within the sanctions debate. A study of U.N. arms embargoes shows cases of successful limitations of arms flows¹⁵. Zachary Selden has argued that financial sanctions are an example of effective sanctions that lead to skyrocketing costs of financial capital¹⁶. Others have linked effectiveness not as much to the type of sanctions as to their length, finding that sanctions can be effective over the first two years of their imposition and that sanctions lose their edge over time as target economies adjust¹⁷. Yet another team has found that depending on the measuring stick employed, sanctions can be considered effective in 37.5% to 56% of the time on a sample of hundreds of cases¹⁸. By contrast, some researchers have refocused from the political impact of sanctions to the “economic pain” they inflict, raising serious doubts even about the effectiveness of targeted sanctions¹⁹.

11. Baldwin, 1985; Hufbauer, 1985.

12. Pape, 1997, 106.

13. Hufbauer *et al.*, 2007, p. 157-158.

14. Elliott, 1998, p. 50-65, at 50-51.

15. Fruchart *et al.*, 2007.

16. Selden, 2010.

17. Dizaji and van Bergeijk, 2013.

18. Clifton Morgan, Bapat, Kobayashi, 2014, p. 546.

19. Shin, Choi and Luo, 2016.

It is of paramount importance to recognize that there is an a priori divergence in approach and a distinct challenge when it comes to sources and data. Those who assert that sanctions “never work” typically de-contextualize their study and measure success against maximalist objectives. Those who argue that sanctions have their place as a tool of foreign policy stress that they can be seen as “rarely, if ever applied with one narrow goal in mind”²⁰ or that “targets and goals are usually multiple” and that “Success is usually a matter of degree”²¹. Further complicating the attainment of consensus is the problem of data. For all of the advances in artificial intelligence, research software development has not yet caught up with the needs of scholars of the contemporary world who face enormous amount of data points potentially relevant to the study of sanctions. By contrast, historians of the pre-modern world face the opposite problem as it is rarely possible to do more but sketch what the economic impact of certain sanctions might have been. There is more to the study of sanctions, however, than the question of whether sanctions “work/ed” implies.

Beyond its role in shaping the analytical apparatus for the analysis of sanctions, Baldwin’s work was also instrumental in seriously entertaining the symbolic and domestic politics value of economic sanctions. Accepting what for many has become a dogmatic position—that sanctions never work—implies that political agents are fundamentally irrational. From this viewpoint, as von Amerongen put it in 1980, sanctions are “a spontaneous reaction in a case of tension”²². This, of course, brings the question of why one and the same power would continuously use sanctions if they were of no benefit at all to the sender. Scholars, therefore, need to make a fundamental—and common among social scientists but typically avoided by humanists—explicit theoretical choice in their analysis of human action. If human action is perceived as fundamentally purposeful irrespective of the agent’s (in)ability to articulate the utility of a given action, then proclaiming that a constantly employed policy tool never works says more about the researcher’s point of departure than about the topic.

While remarks that sanctions have a symbolic utility by way of signaling a particular position internationally or appealing to a domestic audience have a long history, in-depth studies have been uncommon. Considering that the United States accounted for 48% of all cases of sanctions over the last third of the twentieth century²³, it is not surprising that the first substantial efforts to address the question of why sanctions are constantly deployed if they “never work” concerned their main employer. In the late 1990s, a study of the U.S. embargo on Cuba agreed that it was initiated due to foreign policy concerns while isolating Cuban-Americans’ support in combination with their decisive role in presidential elections as the

20. Brady, 1987, p. 298.

21. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, p. 371.

22. Von Amerongen, 1980, p. 159-167, at 160.

23. Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014, p. 545.

key factor underlying its longevity. Concluding that "...U.S. national interests vis-à-vis Cuba have been taken prisoner by a small group of South Florida caudillos", its author placed the sanctions' success within the domestic sphere²⁴. Others accepted the overall thrust of the argument while modifying it by focusing on the interplay between Congress and President, agricultural, and corporate interests²⁵. Historian Shu Guang Zhang's work similarly enriched the debate through a multifaceted analysis of the mechanics of the U.S. embargo against China (1949-1963). Zhang's analysis is attentive to cultural factors, such as Chinese and Soviet anxieties as far as they concern the mechanics of the embargo, but it remains within the functionalist frame of the sanctions debate as far as the embargo's goals are concerned²⁶. As a more nuanced approach to sanctions gained traction, in 2011 Taehee Whang published the first empirical analysis of sanctions in the context of the domestic politics of the United States. Whang distinguishes between an international and a domestic dimension in the use of sanctions. Studying the timing of sanctions imposition in relation to presidential approval ratings from 1948 to 1999, Whang argues that U.S. presidents gain whenever they proclaim sanctions of little cost to the U.S. The actual impact of sanctions to the target country is irrelevant to their domestic impact²⁷.

"Do they work" has thus remained the key question in the study of sanctions, but its focus has expanded from a narrow, functionalist definition confined to the field of international relations to a much more nuanced understanding of the utility that sanctions have to the sender. The proliferation of sanctions in the 1990s, meanwhile, engendered an increasingly prevalent thrust in sanctions studies, a concern with the humanitarian effects of sanctions. Most criticism of embargoes on non-instrumental grounds stems from concerns with the impact of embargoes on the target's population²⁸. The United Nations has often spearheaded criticism of sanctions. In 1995 then U.N. secretary-general Boutros-Ghali argued that sanctions are a "blunt instrument" that afflicts vulnerable groups, complicates the work of humanitarian agencies, causes long-term damage to the productive capacity of target nations, and penalizes neighbors²⁹. By the late 1990s, strong opposition to economic sanctions became firmly entrenched among human rights activists. Thomas Weiss suggested that humanitarians have to re-think their position vis-à-vis military action and embargoes³⁰. Joy Gordon summarized existing moral objections to the use of economic sanctions, seeing the origin of this tool of allegedly modern politics in siege warfare: a form of total warfare that harms the

24. Kaplowitz, 1998, p. 202-6 at 205.

25. Haney and Vanderbush, 2005.

26. Zhang, 2001.

27. Whang, 2011.

28. See Weiss, 1999, p. 499-509; Hufbauer *et al.*, 2007, p. 132.

29. Quoted in Weiss, 1999, p. 499-500.

30. Weiss, 1999, p. 507.

young, old, and the sick above all³¹. Accordingly, human rights activists advocated the replacement of total or extensive economic sanctions with “smart” or targeted sanctions³². Recent work has continued to stress the links between extensive sanctions and human suffering³³. Others, however, have turned the moral question surrounding the use of sanctions on its head. For Shmuel Nili, democratic countries have a moral obligation to sanction dictatorial regimes³⁴.

More recently, the question of the side effects of sanctions has broadened to encompass a host of other issues ranging from criminality to political alliances, to the domestic politics of the target country. For the economist R. T. Naylor, “embargo busting” can be seen as the reason for “transforming the world’s arms black market from a marginal entity...into a veritable global supermarket”; sanctions create massive criminal infrastructures, which remain in place after the sanctions are gone³⁵. While some have argued that multilateral sanctions have higher effectiveness rates, others point out that the most likely embargo-busters are in fact the sender’s own allies or that in practice multilateral sanctions are less effective as they strengthen the regime of the target country vis-à-vis opposition parties in a way in which unilateral sanctions does not³⁶. T.C. Morgan and N. A. Bapat have developed a game theory model to examine how the sender’s own firms react to sanctions³⁷.

How, then, should we analyze embargoes? It would be helpful to remember Baldwin’s dismissal of the binary distinction “between the instrumental and symbolic uses of sanctions”; sanctions, moreover, must be analyzed in the context of other policy choices available and in relation to their total costs to the sender³⁸. Economic sanctions should be analyzed not only with respect to their ability to alter the balance of power or coerce a policy change, but also in terms of their international and domestic utility to the sender, in terms of their ability to signal a particular ideological position, and in terms of their multi-faceted side-effects, which encompass areas as diverse as public health, economic networks, and the internal politics of the target.

Economic Warfare and the Crusades seeks to make the most of the available evidence for the interface of sanctions and crusading in relation to “foreign policy”. By way of case studies, this volume exposes the many side-effects of economic sanctions in Europe and the Mediterranean during the later crusades, ca. 1300 and ca. 1600. Economic sanctions may or may not have attained their supposed

31. Gordon, 1999.

32. Cortright and Lopez, 2002.

33. Allen and Lektzian, 2013, p. 121-35.

34. Nili, 2016.

35. Naylor, 2001, p. 386.

36. Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014, p. 550; Early, 2012; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999.

37. Clifton Morgan and Bapat, 2003.

38. Baldwin, 1999-2000, p. 80-107 at 102.

foreign policy goals, but they certainly had multi-faceted consequences, intended or otherwise. Far from a modern phenomenon, economic sanctions were an integral tool in the instrumentarium of medieval powers. A better understanding of their effects will enhance our knowledge of the later medieval period in Europe and the Mediterranean and allow us to take a step towards a comprehensive history of economic sanctions.

Canon Law, Roman Law, and the Origins of Economic Sanctions

Although economic warfare was practiced in Antiquity, the outset of an uninterrupted, well-developed legal tradition and robust practice of economic sanctions in Europe dates to the high and late Middle Ages (1000-1500). The theory and practice that the later Middle Ages bequeathed to modernity rested on the fundamentally different and often difficult to reconcile traditions of the Roman law and the canon law of the Roman Church. Jurists blended these two strands into Europe's *ius commune* in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and it was this fusion that subsequently underpinned the work of early modern scholars. The legacy of the resulting synthesis remained relevant in the twentieth century³⁹.

The content of the Roman law on the subject presents little complexity but its use in the later Middle Ages requires some knowledge of the workings of medieval jurisprudence. The Codex forbade the export of weapons and iron to barbarians as well as that of wine, oil, and liquids. Moreover, it banned teaching shipbuilding to barbarians and fixed the markets where trade with Persia could take place. The Digest contains prohibitions on the export of shields, swords, and helmets, of grains and salt, and of stones for the sharpening of iron. The original contexts are beside the point. What matters is that legal scholasticism led jurists to reconcile ancient and medieval rulings rather than replace the former with the latter or adapt the law to contemporary realities of political economy. It does not help the students of sanctions that the most widely known and consulted works of medieval jurists were typically written for the classroom, which means that complexities and debatable points abound. What can be considered “policy advice” that summarizes the laws on a given subject in a way that could be useful to a ruler or a bishop was contained not in legal treatises but in the slightly later genre of legal *consilia*⁴⁰. It was only in the sixteenth century that Catholic jurists completely rethought the entire *ius commune* on the subject, combining a comprehensive coverage of the law with concern for its applicability⁴¹. In short,

39. Stantchev, 2012; Stantchev, 2014a; Stantchev, 2021.

40. Stantchev, 2014a, p. 66-71, for a consilium on the subject, Stantchev, 2021, p. 79-82.

41. Stantchev, 2014a, p. 202-6; Stantchev, 2021, p. 82-90.

any understanding of medieval embargoes must begin with an excursus, however brief and high-level, of legal history.

The foundation of all ecclesiastical economic sanctions was the sentence of excommunication pronounced against an individual Christian. Following their famous colleague Sinibaldo Fieschi (Pope Innocent IV, 1243-54), later medieval jurists considered excommunication a bitter medicine, not a medication in modern sense, but rather a means of making sinners aware of their condition that compels them to seek cure (absolution from God and penance from their priest). The ultimate ecclesiastical sanction, excommunication cuts offending Christians from communion with God and the body of the church, temporarily delivering their souls to the devil. In terms of sanctions, the sentence of major excommunication cut sinners from all sorts of contact with the body of faithful, including trade and financial interaction. The purpose of the sanction was medicinal in the sense that the goal was not the loss of the strayed sheep, but its return to the flock; the permanent loss of souls to the devil was of course never a desirable outcome. From the thirteenth century, *ipso iure*, or “automatic” excommunications proliferated. These applied the moment a particular act, such as supplying Muslims with weapons or robbing pilgrims traveling to Rome, was committed. *Ipsa iure* excommunications worked by placing the burden on the conscience of the Christian, rather than on an external enforcement mechanism and thus operated on an altogether different plain from modern penalties⁴².

The sentence of excommunication was the cornerstone of ecclesiastical economic sanctions for three reasons: 1/ as a matter of principle the church could intervene into temporal matters only by reason of sin, 2/ it could not independently impose temporal sanctions, and 3/ it had no authority over non-Christians. What this means is that an expansion of the sentence of excommunication into the temporal sphere required the cooperation of the secular arm and, conversely, that any application of “political sanctions”, such as an embargo against a Muslim polity, had to be completely reconceptualized into a spiritual problem involving the faithful within the papal flock and the infidels without. The reconceptualization of political into spiritual matters, moreover, cannot be dismissed merely as lip service to legal principles. The high importance of jurisprudence in later medieval church practice drove a wedge between the original impetus for many types of sanctions, which was best exposed by crusade theorists in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, and the manner in which various church sanctions actually operated.

One of the best known “political” applications of excommunication was that which Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) pronounced against Emperor Henry IV

42. See in general Vodola, 1986 and Helmholz, 2010, p. 366-93; for a summary in the context of sanctions, Stantchev, 2014a, p. 101-4. For the development of *ipso iure* excommunications, Stantchev and Weber, 2021.

(1054-1105) in 1076 in the midst of one of the greatest disputes between papacy and empire. This episode highlights both the potential gravity and the inherent limitations of excommunication as a tool for the attainment of political goals. First, Henry's own barons used the sentence as a pretext to rebel against him. Then, the emperor found himself compelled to theatrically demonstrate his repentance to the pope, standing barefoot in the snow, humbly asking for admission into the castle of Canossa in January 1077. Third, the canon law compelled a priest to grant absolution to a sincere penitent (outside actions being the litmus test as the priest has no access to the inner feelings and thoughts of the sinner). Consequently, Gregory VII had no choice but to grant absolution, which quickly undermined his standing among the German barons who, ignoring the peculiarities of the canon law, now considered the pope nothing but a traitor⁴³.

Whether the person in question was an emperor allegedly trampling church liberties under foot or a poor Spaniard selling a knife to a Muslim, the purpose of excommunication was to bring back a stray sheep (a sinner) into the flock of the shepherd (the pope seen as vicar of Christ). The primacy of the pastoral concern underpinning the law of the church undermined the power of excommunication in the temporal sphere. Unless ecclesiastical authorities could rely on the secular arm to enforce harsh corporal or monetary penalties, erring Christians always had a loophole to exploit. Whether they committed adultery, infringed on church property, practiced usury, or sold weapons to Muslims, their "sincere repentance" guaranteed re-admission to the flock and a lifting of the censures. Except for condemned heretics who "relapsed" and could then be burnt at the stake by the secular arm, transgressors thus always had a way around ecclesiastical sanctions, typically suffering the comparatively mild penalties of penance and sometimes the equivalent of monetary tax on illicit profits. The resulting complexity reflected the difficulty in maintaining the theoretically clear separation between a spiritual and temporal sphere. Given that a great deal of human social, economic, and political action inherently concerned the pope as much as the emperor, the tug of war between the two powers was a hallmark of high and late medieval European history.

While every Christian was potentially the subject of ecclesiastical censures, sanctions against individual non-Christians targeted chiefly Jews living in Catholic lands whose behavior allegedly failed to comply with the norms of the canon law. Because the canon law had no reach over non-Christians, even if these lived under Christian rule, it directed its attention to the actions of Christians whom it banned from interacting with offending Jews and whom it threatened with excommunication. The fundamental purpose of these sanctions was to compel Christians and Jews to maintain the social order intended by the canon law⁴⁴.

43. Tierney, 1996, p. 53-73.

44. Stantchev, 2014a, 95-97. On the law on the subject more broadly, Pakter 1988.

Papal sanctions against communities require a slightly more extended typology and greater attention to chronology. On the whole, these can be subdivided into three main groups: sanctions against Catholics, heretics, and non-Christians outside of Christendom. The greatest challenge in understanding medieval perceptions lay in the fact that the jurists oscillated between theology and legal scholasticism without ever successfully reconciling the inherent tension. Theologically, the pastoral logic of the canon law had room for only a single distinction: sheep within the flock (faithful) and those without (infidels). Yet, from the viewpoint of legal scholasticism, the broader category of infidel did subdivide into three distinct ones: heretics (and thus schismatics who persist in a schism), Jews, and pagans (and consequently Saracens, who were seen as pagans). Dispositions initially devised against one group of “infidels” became automatically applicable against any other. Although it was well aware of Islam and Muslims, the medieval legal tradition never made room for them as an independent category simply because the authoritative texts it favored were composed prior to the seventh century and thus never spoke of Muslims (Saracens)⁴⁵.

Papal sanctions against Catholic rulers and cities—called interdict—were in effect excommunications writ large. The interdict was a territorialized expression of the sentence of excommunication that suspended ecclesiastical services within a given territory and subjected said territory to a host of economic sanctions. Peter Clarke has offered a comprehensive study of the subject. Interdicts were meant to function very much as modern sanctions are supposed to: coercing the target into compliance “by turning the innocent against the guilty⁴⁶”. Clarke has established that interdicts proliferated from the early thirteenth century⁴⁷. Just as individual excommunicates were considered temporarily delivered to the devil, so interdicted Christians were in effect infidels—and the same logic applied backwards as well, “as Nicholas IV put it in 1291, Sicily was under interdict (in the aftermath of the Vespers of 1282) because of the rebellion of the infidel Sicilians⁴⁸”. Taking advantage of a considerably deeper source base, Richard Trexler’s brilliant work on the papal interdict against Florence in 1376-8 placed equal value on spiritual and temporal sanctions and remains the best case-study of a medieval interdict and thereby of a short-term application of papal economic sanctions⁴⁹.

Disobedient Catholics placed under interdict during the pontificate of Innocent III and his immediate successors were not technically heretics. By contrast, contemporary Christian communities in what would later become known as the south of France were considered Albigensian heretics expounding a dualist

45. Stantchev, 2014b.

46. Clarke, 2007, p. 169.

47. Clarke, 2007, p. 183-187.

48. Stantchev, 2014a, p. 99.

49. Trexler, 1974.

doctrine inherently inimical to the Roman Church. The alleged Cathars became subject to ecclesiastical commercial sanctions as early as 1145 and formally from 1179. All forms of support, including any type of trade was forbidden⁵⁰. In 1208-29, attempts at crusading and economic sanctions merged into a single effort against “heretics” in Provence known as the Albigensian Crusade, a major event in the history of the region which ended with its integration into the Kingdom of France and which paved the way for the inquisition to carry out the task of bringing back the alleged heretics into the papal flock.

We can now outline the intersection between economic sanctions and crusades. The fundamental problem in defining the subject is that the word crusade, used as a concept denoting a series of wars proclaimed by the papacy, is a modern invention⁵¹. For this reason, a degree of disagreement will always exist as there is no medieval concept to use as a reference point. Nevertheless, over the last decades, historians studying the language of papal sermons and letters and the decisions of church councils have convincingly demonstrated that there was never an essential difference, in the eyes of ecclesiastical authorities, between campaigns aimed at Muslims, pagans, heretics, schismatics, or at disobedient Catholic princes.

“Crusades” is a modern label given to papally-organized military campaigns, participation in which was perceived to entail the remission of sins (for those who survive) and salvation (for those who die on campaign). Armed pilgrimages or simply “passages” (called crusades in modernity) were undertaken to the Holy Land where they involved warfare with Muslims, called in the contemporary Latin sources Saracens. Variations of the theme took place in Iberia (also against Muslims), northern Europe (against pagans), the Balkans (against Eastern Christians and then against Muslims) as well as throughout the core areas of western Europe (against “heretics” and disobedient Catholic rulers). The First Crusade took place in 1095/6-1099. The crusade movement has no clear-cut end date; it died out slowly at the turn of early modernity. Called “later crusades”, crusades after the Latin loss of the Holy Land in 1291 form the background to this volume’s contributions⁵².

Economic sanctions were not originally part of the crusading toolbox. The first formal attempt at cutting trade in relation to crusades was the canon *Ita quorundam* of the Third Lateran Council in 1179. The cornerstone of all subsequent legislation well into early modernity, this canon banned Christians from delivering weapons, iron, and timber for the construction of galleys to Saracens (Muslims)

50. Stantchev, 2014a, p. 99-101.

51. On this subject, Weber, 2024.

52. The chapters of this volume offer extensive bibliographies on the history of crusading. For overviews see Riley-Smith, 2005 and Madden, 2014. On the later crusades: Housley, 1986; Housley 1992; Housley, 2012; Housley, 2017; Weber, 2013.

as well as from serving on Saracen vessels. When Saladin conquered Jerusalem in 1187, the embargo became total in principle, which was unacceptable to the maritime powers on which the crusading states depended. Therefore, the papacy and maritime powers quickly found a mutually agreeable solution: that items useful for the waging of war would be perpetually banned while all other goods would be traded under papal license. Pioneered by Venice, this regime slowly took hold across the Mediterranean in the thirteenth century. When the Holy Land was definitively lost to the Catholic cause in 1291, renewed total embargoes on trade with Egypt and Syria were followed by the establishment of a much more extensive licensing regime which was particularly notable in the fourteenth century, but which remained in place until the Ottoman conquest of the region in 1516-7. Between 1179 and the mid-thirteenth century, the embargo came to apply to all targets of crusading within and without Christendom. Thus by the outset of the fourteenth century, economic warfare and crusades had become bedfellows⁵³.

How are we to assess economic warfare in relation to the crusades? Whether papal trade bans “worked” will depend on the measuring stick applied. From the point of view of canon law, the effectiveness of excommunication needs to be judged in a way that is completely different from the expectations of historians of medieval trade and crusade or of scholars partaking in the modern sanctions debate. That acts like usury or trade with Muslims were commonplace does not mean that excommunication did not work. Richard Helmholz and John Munro have argued that ecclesiastical prohibitions against usury were considerably more effective than oft-repeated historiographical “truths” allow⁵⁴. My work on papal embargo has similarly demonstrated that Catholic merchants “played the system” in two ways. The preferred manner for individuals of higher social status was not to break the law, which would have exposed them to machinations from their rivals, but to obtain a dispensation from the law (a papal trade license) ahead of time (cities often obtained such licenses covering all of their citizens). “Lower-class” Christians as well as upper class ones engaging in always forbidden trade (such as the export of weapons to Muslims) ate their cake while also having it by first busting the sanctions and then, typically when sick or dying, repenting for their actions and paying a monetary penalty⁵⁵. Thus the embargo often resulted in a delayed tax on illicit income that was sometimes borne in practice by the heirs of the dying penitent. Most importantly, canonists never expected most humans to be able to live a life without sin (which, after all, would make the clergy itself unnecessary). The expectation was that the laity would live their lives in a continuous cycle of sin and penance. So long as sinners eventually re-entered the papal flock, the goal was accomplished. The long lists of individuals asking for

53. Stantchev, 2014a.

54. Helmholz, 1986 and Munro, 2003.

55. Stantchev, 2014a, p. 145-61, 189-99.

papal trade licenses and repenting for sanction busting demonstrates that papal sanctions had their validity as a pastoral staff⁵⁶.

The most common question, however, is posed not from the perspective of medieval but rather of modern history: whether papal economic sanctions ever delivered results in the ambit of political economy. In this respect, too, traditional works on medieval trade and crusade have left much to be desired for they have been content with listing anecdotes of trade and equating the persistence of trade with the failure of sanctions. The only in-depth twentieth-century study of a medieval instance of economic sanctions was Richard Trexler's exemplary work on Florence, which benefited from a clear analytical framework and a comparatively large yet not overwhelming source base. Pope Gregory XI (1370-8) halted trade with Florentines and called for the seizure of their goods across Christendom. The effectiveness of this papal action depended on royal cooperation: the Florentines suffered greatly in Castile, Leon, and Aragon, while the kings of England and France objected to what they saw as papal interference with their sovereignty⁵⁷. Papal bans on rituals and sacraments had, per se, equally inconclusive effects, chiefly resulting in highly volatile popular sentiment rather than in a clear-cut position pro or against the pope⁵⁸. For all their complexities, papal sanctions against Florence in the period 1376-1512 were successful, presumably due to the high exposure of a power that was above all economic rather than territorial and whose citizens engaged in economic activities all over Europe⁵⁹.

When it comes to targets of crusades, however, particularly such waged against Muslims in the Mediterranean or pagans in the Baltic, the lack of suitable sources prevents the historians from painting a picture with anything but the broadest of strokes. For example, it is clear that some political entities, like Venice avoided busting papal sanctions at the state level even if individual citizens regularly did so. It is also clear, however, that other state entities, like the Crown of Aragon, did engage in blatant violations of the canon law. A focused inquiry might well establish that merchant governments, contrary to common opinion, were less likely to bust sanctions because their far-flung economic activities made them highly exposed to various types of pressure to which monarchies were less susceptible.

What medievalists have generally ignored is to consider embargoes within a broader spectrum of policy options. Crusades were costly, difficult to organize, and a logistical nightmare. The outcome of crusades directly impacted papal prestige. Failure posed tough questions about the pope's relation to God as well as about the papacy's role in Christian society. By contrast, embargoes against

56. Esch, 2012; Stantchev, 2014a.

57. Trexler, 1974, p. 44-108.

58. Trexler, 1974, p. 109-162.

59. Trexler, 1974, p. 163-186.

non-Christians came at little to no cost to the papacy. Unless a set of sanctions became altogether impossible to reconcile with the interests of powerful political actors--as the total embargo against Mamluk Egypt in the 1340s vis-à-vis the needs and interests of Venice and Genoa--the papacy had little reason to back off sanctions that it had imposed irrespective of their ability to “work” as tools of “foreign policy”.

In short, in cases of embargoes against external to Latin Christendom targets of crusading, any benefit from the imposition of sanctions, however minor, would have exceeded the costs the papacy bore in imposing them. Moreover, the preserved source material does not allow us to conclusively trace the impact of papal sanctions on targets outside Latin Christendom. This causes the traditional instrumental question of whether papal embargo worked as a tool of crusading to bifurcate. When it comes to targets outside of Latin Christendom subjected to strategic export restrictions, the instrumental side of the question whether they “worked” is rather moot. The interesting questions relate instead to embargoes within Latin Christendom, on the one hand, and to the by-effects of all embargoes, on the other hand. Whatever their undeterminable impact on the target, later medieval embargoes had a wide range of important side effects.

Economic Warfare and the Crusades: Goals and Contributions

Economic Warfare and the Crusades offers a sequence of case studies on economic sanctions and crusading in the later Middle Ages to accomplish two goals. First, this volume’s chapters offer conclusive summaries on what is known and/or knowable about specific episodes of economic warfare in relation to crusades in the later Middle Ages. Second, these chapters seek to determine what can be known about the side effects of economic warfare in the political and economic spheres. Nineteenth-century historians well knew that the papal embargo against Mamluk Egypt temporarily re-directed much Christian trade with Alexandria to Cyprus and Cilician Armenia⁶⁰. Subsequently, however, this fruitful avenue towards the study of the byproducts of economic sanctions was left largely unexplored. It is equally important to specify what this volume does not study.

Economic Warfare and the Crusades does not discuss recently analyzed topics like the legal basis of embargoes, their effects within the ambit of “domestic politics,” or the impact of later medieval legal thought on early modern thought⁶¹. Similarly, this volume does not address the humanitarian consequences of economic sanctions. On the one hand, this is simply because no scholars working

60. Notably, Depping 1830, Vol. II, Chapter X, p. 170-204, Heyd 1983 [1885], primarily Vol. I, p. 386-387 and Vol. II, p. 23-57.

61. On these topics see Stantchev, 2014a and Stantchev, 2021.

on the subject could be identified. Furthermore, medieval jurists typically displayed no concern with the devastation that the application of total halts of trade and financial relations could potentially have on the target. On the contrary, the language used against heretics was particularly harsh as it drew a clear binary expectation: the target would either return to the flock and obedience or would be destined to hell. Whenever the papacy relaxed embargoes on humanitarian grounds, this was done on account not on their impact on the target population, but on the sender's own: the legal concept of "urgent necessity" was used to justify the legal continuation of most trade between Catholics and others.

Economic Warfare and the Crusades begins with Alexander Nikolov's overview of the crusade treatises that articulated a system of Catholic economic warfare against Mamluk Egypt at the turn of the fourteenth century. In the context of Louis IX's death in 1270 and increasing Mamluk pressure, Pope Gregory X sought advice on how to defend what was left of the crusader states in the Holy Land. The first works of the resulting new genre did not, however, appear until the eve—and aftermath—of the fall of Acre in 1291 which marked the end of crusader states on the mainland. Arguably the first, the work of Fidenzio of Padua contains all the main components that marked the resulting genre of *recuperatio* treatises: works on crusading strategy on the recovery of the Holy Land composed by well-informed authors from a variety of backgrounds. The first of its kind, the genre highlighted the importance of economic sanctions as a necessary and indispensable first step towards the weakening of Mamluk power in preparation of a general crusade. Going beyond twelfth century ideas, crusading treatises of the new genre proposed that the sanctions be enforced through an indefinite naval blockade. In the 1310s, William of Adam added the idea of a concomitant naval blockade of the Red Sea, aimed at completely cutting Egypt from the spice trade. Following up on earlier thought and the precedents of the Fifth Crusade and the first crusade of Louis IX, the authors of crusader treatises saw control of Egypt as the indispensable precondition of successful maintenance of Latin control of the Holy Land. These ideas achieved their most detailed articulation in the work of the Venetian Marin Sanudo whose *Book of the Faithful of the Secrets of the Cross* was completed in the early 1320s. Sanudo's book represents a fully developed treatise of political economy. Nevertheless, the authors of "recovery" treatises often had their own agendas. For the Catalan Ramon Lull, any and all action was subordinate to an ultimate goal that transcended matters of political economy: the conversion of all infidels. King Charles II of Anjou self-fashioned a crusader persona in service of his political goals in Italy. Sanudo himself clearly envisioned Venetian commercial dominance of the eastern Mediterranean as the ultimate outcome of economic warfare and crusading against Egypt. While crusader treatises likely had a fleeting impact on papal policy, they demonstrate the keen understanding of the theory of economic warfare possessed not only by later medieval merchants, but also by ecclesiastics and aristocrats. Thus Chapter

1 sets the stage for all subsequent inquiries: by the late Middle Ages all the fundamental presuppositions of economic warfare were well-known and thus any and all failures of attempts to practice economic warfare cannot be simplistically attributed to a “medieval” lack of understanding or sophistication.

Nicholas Coureas’ Chapter 2 proceeds with a detailed examination of the impact of the papal embargo against Mamluk Egypt on the Kingdom of Cyprus between 1291 and 1375. Coureas outlines the efforts of the royal, Templar, and Hospitaller fleets to impose a naval blockade on Mamluk Egypt. Although the papal embargo and the necessarily piecemeal efforts at naval blockade did not altogether halt trade between western Europe and Cyprus, the sanctions had wide-ranging side effects. First, Coureas confirms and enriches previous findings with respect to the redirection of trade after 1291. Papal embargo turned Cyprus (and Cilician Armenia) into an emporium that mediated between Mamluk and western ports. Eastern Mediterranean merchants displaced some of their western rivals. Over time, Cypriots came to perceive of papal sanctions as a deliberate attempt at aiding the island. This finding considerably enhances our understanding of the perceptions that frontier-region Christians had of the embargo. Second, the papal embargo against Mamluk Egypt resulted in a conflict between the papacy and the Latin clergy on the island, on the one hand, and the temporal administration of the kingdom, on the other hand. Third, “The Papal Embargo and the Kingdom of Cyprus” summarizes what is knowable about enforcement efforts and transgressions alike. On the one hand, galleys belonging to the king, the military orders, and even the maritime powers occasionally detained both Christian and Muslim vessels and even raided enemy territory. Clergy and royal officials occasionally collaborated to enforce the embargo. On the other hand, prominent Cypriots, including noblemen filled the ranks of embargo-busters. Cypriots were active in the procurement of trade licenses and used the inherent loophole of the canon law that allowed penitents off the hook in exchange for what amounted to a tax on contraband. By the mid-fourteenth century, the re-orientation of papal attention from Mamluk Egypt and the Holy Land to Turkish emirates and the Aegean resulted in the granting of broad licenses that re-established large-scale direct trade between western ports and Egypt and undermined Cyprus’ ability to benefit from the role of middleman. Coureas, furthermore, offers an outline of the ways in which papal prohibitions of pilgrimage to Mamluk-controlled Jerusalem fit within the system of sanctions. In short, Coureas’ contribution demonstrates the two sides of the story. On the one hand, the papal embargo did not result in the complete cessation of trade between western and Mamluk ports and did nothing to alter the strategic balance of power in favor of a future large-scale crusade, as advocated by crusade theorists. On the other hand, the embargo had wide-ranging and significant by-effects on trade routes, the island of Cyprus, and on all parties involved. The resumption of regular western trade with Egypt and

the consequent decline in Cyprus' trade underpinned Peter I's sack of Alexandria in 1365.

Mike Carr's "Economic Warfare against the Turks", Chapter 3, reveals an altogether different side of the effects that papal embargo had on the eastern Mediterranean. In the first half of the fourteenth century, various Turkish emirates in Asia Minor, and especially that of Aydin, emerged as significant threats to Latin interests in the Aegean Sea as well as to the local Greek Christians. The realities of Aegean trade, however, were altogether different from those of trade between Europe and the Near East. Asia Minor was, above all, an exporter rather than an importer of raw materials. Conversely, Latin merchants were chiefly exporters, rather than importers of high value merchandise. Accordingly, the fundamental instrumental premise of papal embargo—that Christians must not supply Muslims with war materiel—made no sense in the Aegean. This is the likely reason why the papacy did not proclaim any specific embargoes against Turkish emirates even if the general principles of not exporting weapons and war materiel to Saracens or Turks always applied and was integrated in Venetian treaties with Turks. At the same time, Latin actors in the Aegean constantly needed help in their resistance to Turkish raids. Accordingly, the papacy began to use licenses for trade with Mamluk Egypt as a way to bolster Latin powers in the Aegean and/or to reward participants in crusading efforts against the Turks. In the wake of the Smyrna crusade, licenses were used to support the Latin garrison of the town. From the 1340s, severe political and trade disputes in the Black Sea and Aegean Sea areas compelled the papacy to relent in its opposition to all trade with Mamluk Egypt, thereby establishing a wide-ranging licensing regime that remained in place until the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516-7. Whether individual papal licenses attained their stated goals is practically impossible to tell. Although there is evidence for the actual use of licenses, detail is elusive.

Nevertheless, context as well as the high interest in papal licenses, well-documented for the fourteenth century, allow Carr to outline the various impacts of the licensing regime and of papal embargo on the Aegean Sea. Overall, although crusade theorists like Marin Sanudo advocated a total ban on trade with Turks, papal policy did not establish a blanket embargo on Latin trade with Turkish emirates. Rather, papal licenses for trade with Mamluks were issued in order to facilitate Latin resistance to Turkish raids in the Aegean. Carr, moreover, highlights three particularly interesting byproducts of embargo and the licensing regime. First, it is highly likely that papal trade license played a significant role in ensuring the prosperity of Genoese-ruled Chios. Second, licenses were of great importance to the Rhodes-based Order of the Hospital as well, which regularly petitioned the papacy for permits that were necessary for the knights to sustain themselves. Third, to maximize its use of licenses predicated upon the number of vessels involved, Venice built its unique, large merchant galleys one-third larger

than usual. Similarly, permits for individual (round) ships were fulfilled by building very large vessels. Thus the embargo stimulated the building of higher-tonnage naval vessels.

Carr's arguments raise a particularly intriguing question of social history. It is well-established that the Commercial Revolution of the thirteenth century was marked by a socially broad participation in long-distance trade (in Italy and the maritime regions of France and Iberia). It is equally well-known that from the fourteenth century, trade concentrated much more firmly in the hands of "upper-class" agents. Papal licenses were typically obtained either by the leading maritime powers, such as Venice or Genoa, or by individuals of high social status elsewhere. In other words, papal embargo "put shackles on the feet" of ordinary merchants in two ways: first, by theoretically prohibiting all trade with Mamluk Egypt and, second, by offering exceptions to the richest and best-connected economic actors. Whether this development played a role in the concentration of wealth and economic opportunity characteristic of the fourteenth century is an open question that is worth exploring.

In Chapter 4, Albert Cassanyes Roig turns the attention from the eastern to the western Mediterranean to study the effects of papal prohibitions of trade with Muslims on the kingdoms of Aragon, Castile, and Portugal. In Iberia—as with crusades more broadly—kings played a pivotal role in mediating between ideas generated at the center of the church and their practical implementation. By far the most far-reaching effect of papal trade prohibitions on Iberian kingdoms was their use as a model that kings quickly adapted in the pursuit of their own political purposes. While Alphonse X of Castile included the canonical bans on trade with Muslims into the *Siete Partidas*, prohibitions were pursued in accordance with royal self-interest. This does not mean that they had no impact on trade. When James I attempted to organize a crusade originating in Barcelona in 1269, the effort including a ban on trade with Egypt, which caused losses to Catalan merchants. Despite the failure of the effort, trade was slow to recover. Moreover, Mamluk Egypt seems to have turned the continuation of trade into a precondition for allowing Catalan pilgrimage access to the Holy Land in the late thirteenth century. Individuals commonly obtained licenses that mitigated the potential impact of papal embargo and/or outright transgressed the sanctions. More notably, in the context of the Aragonese-papal conflict over Sicily, the kings themselves overtly busted the embargo. In short, while it is doubtful that papal embargo had any impact in terms of affecting the balance of power between Christian and Islamic powers in the eastern Mediterranean, its consequences were significant, ranging from forcing merchants to constantly negotiate the bans to offering kings a template for their own use of economic sanctions.

Benjamin Weber's work on papal naval attempts at enforcing the embargo in the mid-fifteenth century, Chapter 5 of this volume, shows why key theoretical

positions outlined in crusading treatises were incongruent with the realities of the later Middle Ages. The pontificate of the Aragonese Calixtus III (1455-8) saw the short-lived yet vigorous development of a papal arsenal capable of producing a viable, if small fleet of war galleys. By the mid-fifteenth century, the major papal objective in the Mediterranean was no longer the Mamluk Empire, but rather the Ottoman polity, which was transformed into a veritable empire through Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and his consequent centralization of Ottoman government around the person of the sultan. In the spring of 1456, Calixtus' newly constructed crusading fleet detained the ship of the Venetian Nicolò Fiorin. According to the papal commander, the fleet had assisted the Venetians during a storm off Sicily. The amount of cash they carried provoked the suspicion of the papal commander who confiscated their money, sequestered their goods, and investigated whether they had sold contraband in Tripoli, sending his complete record to the pope to make a final decision on whether the Venetians were smugglers. According to Fiorin, however, the papal men boarded his vessel while it was suffering shipwreck off Lampedusa and simply stole everything on which they could put their hands. Weber's in-depth work with both the papal and the Venetian record shows that Fiorin was proven right and that Calixtus found himself compelled to condemn his own men. At the same time, Calixtus desperately needed the latter's services. Accordingly, he paid the Venetians back by using money collected for the crusade while leaving his commanders off the hook. The fact that a well-prepared papal fleet led by experienced seamen failed to walk the fine line between punishing contrabandists and outright piracy demonstrates not only the complexity of applicable laws, but also the inherent impracticality of crusading theory as it related to economic sanctions and naval blockades.

In Chapter 6, Maria Bonet Donato flips the coin on its other side, studying not the mechanics or the effects of economic sanctions but rather the mechanisms whereby the standard-bearer of crusading and economic warfare in the eastern Mediterranean—the Hospitallers of Rhodes—were financially supported. From the mid-fifteenth century, the Master of Rhodes and the Hospitaller Treasury used dramatic messaging about the complex military situation in the eastern Mediterranean to increase the fiscal and financial pressure on the priories, especially the Castellania of Amposta, the Priory of Catalonia, and the Priory of Navarre. The Knights proved capable of raising and sustaining this support and resisting Ottoman pressure until 1522 thanks to their modern, centralized governmental organization. This pan-Mediterranean interaction was conducted and mediated by the highest dignitaries of the order, with the support of the pope and the king of Aragon. Tight governance structures and far-ranging connections within the church and Iberian kingdoms, allowed the Hospitallers to justify a series of requests for men, armaments, financial resources, credit, and, above all, income, and responsibilities from the commanderies and priories, particularly in

northeastern Iberia. This intensification of ordinary and especially extraordinary petitionary measures, particularly after 1454, affected the financial and fiscal capacity of these priories. This resulted in depleted resources and even impacted the patrimony. Therefore, the very existence and viability of the Hospitaller base on Rhodes depended on a rearguard in the western Mediterranean which could support only that much fiscal pressure.

Thus Bonet's chapter makes for an instructive contrast with Weber's work on the papal fleet. Maritime power in the fifteenth century was (and remains today) a particularly expensive proposition and thus the preserve of a limited number of players that could either rely on a permanent, well-developed infrastructure developed because of trade (Venice, Genoa, and, to an extent, the Crown of Aragon) or on centralized states disposing of large demographic and material resources. The latter group--the Ottoman Empire, France, and Spain--only emerged as serious naval powers in the second half of the fifteenth century. By contrast, elite, limited-in-size powers like the Order of the Hospital could and did pioneer advanced techniques of government which allowed them to punch far above their weight in political and military matters. The story of the Hospitallers of Rhodes was, more broadly, an embodiment of Marin Sanudo's idea of economic warfare and preliminary crusading. The Hospitallers distinguished themselves chiefly as indiscriminate pirates who, depending on one's point of view, enforced or abused the canon law on trade with infidels to the point of provoking a Venetian raid of Rhodes in the 1460s. While the existence of a powerful crusader base on Rhodes did not result in a reconquest of Jerusalem or hinder Ottoman expansion, the history of the order remains a fascinating experiment in governance as well as in religious, social, and military history. Donato's chapter contributes significantly to our knowledge of how the knights sustained themselves in the last period of their presence on Rhodes.

Chapters 7 and 8, written respectively by Anti Selart and Martin Neuding Skoog, work in tandem and turn our attention from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. Selart's chapter, which studies the period 1200-1400, opens with an overview of debates and historical developments. Whereas pre-WWII studies focused on the question whether crusades and conquests were needed to open western trade with Russia, subsequent works emphasized the pre-existence of transit routes and the potential benefits of a buffer zone. What is certain is that the first half of the thirteenth century saw a thorough reconfiguration in the social and economic history of northeastern Europe in which crusades and conquest played but one part. For example, the island of Gotland was temporarily a great beneficiary of its role as transshipment point which it then lost to resident merchants using cogs, larger vessels that did not require an intermediate stop. Similarly, the development of the cog displaced Russian merchants from the surface of the sea, as these no longer traveled west of Livonia. Various types of trade restrictions were in common use in the region well before the importation of the papal embargo in

the thirteenth century. This embargo, which transposed the principles of a policy borne out of Mediterranean realities with no account for the ecology of the Baltic, was to be applied by lords whose interests it undermined and who therefore had little incentive to do their part. Meanwhile, petitioners from Sweden asked the papacy for embargoes against their rivals in Karelia and Novgorod. The papal embargo on the export of weapons and goods useful for the waging of war made its way into the secular legislation of the region. Its actual impact on trade, however, was rather delayed: it becomes visible in the sources only after 1400. In the fifteenth century, it was Muscovy that emerged as the main adversary of Livonian territorial lords and thus as the main target of embargo.

Skoog's "Munitions for Muscovy", Chapter 8, brings home the lines of inquiry opened up by Selart's contribution. Benefiting from a much more robust source-base for the period 1400-1600, Skoog is able to trace in considerable detail several of the effects that the papal embargo had on the north long after the decline of the papacy as a political power and the outset of protestant reformations. After outlining the problematic and the source base, Skoog surveys the relevant legislation and its application to the Baltic. Thereafter, Chapter 8 turns to tracing the actual impact of sanctions, which Skoog finds to have been, overall, determined by a constant "tug of war between strategic and commercial interest". Numerous examples of embargo enforcement demonstrate its continued relevance in the sixteenth century. The idea of a strategic embargo against the enemy had become so firmly entrenched in the area that even political actors little inclined to respect the sanctions, found it necessary to uphold them pro forma, continuously re-affirming their legitimacy. Skoog then turns to outlining the various ways in which the sanctions were commonly breached. First, state-organized shipments of weapons to Muscovy occurred before and after the outset of protestant reformations. Key suspects were the English who sought trade privileges in Muscovy while the tsars looked for political alliances. Second, strategic metals and chemicals were shipped in violation of sanctions by individuals as well as by state actors. Among the latter, England and Denmark were the most notorious embargo-busters while, depending on the king, Sweden's policy oscillated between enforcement and transgression. Third, artisans specializing in military production were in constant demand in Muscovy. Artisans, shipbuilders, and sailors alike busted the sanctions by offering their services to the tsar. This was not without risk, however, as documented instances of executed artisans caught on their way to Muscovy attest.

In conclusion, Skoog analyses the rationales behind the complex mixture of nominal adherence to the principles of strategic embargo and their common busting in practice. State actors violated the sanctions they nominally upheld not in the pursuit of immediate commercial profits, but rather in that of increased market opportunities in Muscovy as the tsar used his trade partners' willingness to bust the sanctions as a litmus test of their loyalty. In the case of England, the

export of weapons allowed avoiding a deficit and thus the outflow of specie in the context of mercantilist policies. Ironically, the well-entrenched legal system of sanctions motivated state actors not neighboring Muscovy to export items they may not have been trading in the absence of sanctions. Logically, then, it was Poland that emerged as the most dedicated supporter of strictly enforced sanctions against Muscovy. Documented instances of individual embargo-busting also attest not to a desire for immediate profit as much as to the pursuit of long-term privileges and opportunities in Muscovy. All in all, protestant states in the sixteenth century conferred legitimacy to a policy that originated in the service of a papally-led Christendom. On the one hand, states like England and Denmark regularly busted the sanctions. On the other hand, the fact that they upheld the sanctions *de jure* and occasionally even enforced them ensured the sanctions' vitality as a means of continuously reinforcing an east-west divide.

Alexandra Kaar's "Economic Warfare and the Crusades against the Hussites, 1420–1436" turns the reader's attention to economic warfare within Latin Christendom. Unlike the case of the Holy Land, crusading and economic warfare against heretics were not the subject of extensive theorizing. Nevertheless, contemporaries had a clear understanding of the strategic potential of export restrictions. A comprehensive trade embargo played a considerable role in Catholic attempts to suppress the Hussite movement in the 1420s and the first half of the 1430s. Kaar's contribution studies the background, implementation, and consequences of this embargo.

The economic reality of Central Europe was that of tight economic interdependence caused by long-established trade patterns. Bohemia's closely knit economic connections with its neighbors—especially regarding the trade in basic foodstuffs—simultaneously informed and hampered embargo enforcement. Loyalists sought to control key trade arteries while also keeping an eye on the emergence of new roads and bypasses. As part of this process, loyalists manipulated the existing system of regularly renewed trade privileges to further their own commercial interests against business rivals. While embargoing trade with Venice, Emperor Sigismund employed freebooters in the Alpine passes. This system was not used during the Hussite wars, however, because it was not practical: the comparatively minor value of most trade into Bohemia made capturing smugglers comparatively unprofitable. Instead, loyalists coupled attempts to control trade routes with the direct supervision of merchants. Papal efforts centered on isolating Bohemia in conjuncture with royal authorities, with a focus on weapons and war materiel, the same type of items traditionally forbidden on crusading fronts in the Mediterranean and the Baltic. A notable difference from the latter realities was the complete absence of papal licenses for any trade with Hussites in the 1420s and the 1430s. Such permits only appeared in the second half of the fifteenth century, by when the idea of forcefully re-incorporating the Hussites had been largely abandoned. Despite a keen awareness of the potential of sanctions, Catholic

agents largely failed to follow through. While Bohemia was greatly dependent on, for example, the import of salt, the spiritual nature of papal embargo blunted its ability to attain foreign policy goals. The sanctions only applied to Hussites while the population of the embargoed region was mixed; moreover, cohabitation was widespread. Accordingly, it was all but impossible for Hussites and Catholics within Bohemia to disentangle their economic interests and interdependence. Thus cohabitation, the conflicting interests of major players, and the near impossibility of sealing off a landlocked territory whose economy had long been integrated into that of neighboring lands inherently curtailed the ability of papal sanctions to aid crusading efforts against the Hussites. Only the arms embargo is likely to have had some of its intended effects on the target.

Yet, for all their limitations as tools of “foreign policy”, these sanctions did have clear and significant effects. In terms of intended consequences, the sanctions “contributed to the overall war fatigue” thereby playing a role in ending the conflict. Economic warfare against the Hussites, moreover, had three important side effects. First, the embargo played a role in the permanent reshaping of trade patterns. Second, just as Cyprus in the case of the papal embargo against Mamluk territories, so border towns in Central Europe played the role of middlemen and greatly benefited from the sanctions regime. Third, the sanctions added another dimension to pre-existing business rivalries.

Finally, Georg Christ’s Chapter 10, “Venice, Papal Embargoes, and Naval Crusades, 1291-1344” concludes *Economic Warfare and the Crusades* by bringing together several of the volume’s themes. Chapter 10 studies trade embargoes/boycotts and naval blockades in the Middle Ages in the context of crusade, late medieval state formation and commercial hegemony. Christ summarizes and analyzes what we know about two simultaneous papal wars with elements of economic warfare that both involved Venice as a target: war against the Mamluk Empire in the context of a crusade for the liberation of the Holy Land in 1308 and against Venice in the context of the conflict over Ferrara in 1308-1313. In the first case, Venice was the target of maritime policing trying to prevent trade with Egypt while in the second case, the Holy See took aim at Venice’s economic hegemony on the Italian hinterland. Christ argues that the pope kept the two agendas strictly separate probably mirroring the differentiation of papal secular and spiritual authority. Chapter 10 also suggests that in both cases the papal economic sanctions were carefully measured and thus did not change the status quo significantly. Trade with the Mamluk Empire continued but now chiefly through Cyprus as a replacement emporium. Despite the defeat in Ferrara, Venice continued to control access to the Po River and thus trade in Northern Italy but had to re-focus on a seaborne approach to controlling the estuary of the Po.

Thus Christ’s contribution highlights 1/ the clear understanding that medieval thinkers and “policy-makers” had of the potential of economic sanctions as tools

of “foreign policy”, 2/ the fact that ecclesiastical embargoes could be applied with a keen understanding of their side effects, 3/ the sophisticated understanding of balance of power politics displayed by the papal curia (in fact, more so than the one demonstrated by Venice) as it balanced crusading in the east with Italian politics as well as the pastoral power of the popes with their role as temporal princes in central Italy. In short, Chapter 10 highlights the fact that economic sanctions were deeply engrained in European statecraft during the Later Crusades.

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